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Abstract
Robust machine learning is currently one of the most
prominent topics which could potentially help shaping a fu-
ture of advanced AI platforms that not only perform well
in average cases but also in worst cases or adverse situa-
tions. Despite the long-term vision, however, existing studies
on black-box adversarial attacks are still restricted to very
specific settings of threat models (e.g., single distortion met-
ric and restrictive assumption on target model’s feedback to
queries) and/or suffer from prohibitively high query complex-
ity. To push for further advances in this field, we introduce a
general framework based on an operator splitting method,
the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to
devise efficient, robust black-box attacks that work with vari-
ous distortion metrics and feedback settings without incur-
ring high query complexity. Due to the black-box nature of
the threat model, the proposed ADMM solution framework is
integrated with zeroth-order (ZO) optimization and Bayesian
optimization (BO), and thus is applicable to the gradient-free
regime. This results in two new black-box adversarial attack
generation methods, ZO-ADMM and BO-ADMM. Our empir-
ical evaluations on image classification datasets show that
our proposed approaches have much lower function query
complexities compared to state-of-the-art attack methods,
but achieve very competitive attack success rates.
1. Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have
achieved significant breakthroughs [1] in many machine
learning (ML) tasks. However, despite these success sto-
ries, there have been many recent studies showing that even
state-of-the-art DNNs might still be vulnerable to adversar-
ial misclassification attacks [2, 3]. The adversarial attacks
find and add visually imperceptible noises to an originally
correctly classified input and essentially cause it to be mis-
classified by the DNNs. This raises security concerns about
the robustness of DNNs in extreme situations with high relia-
bility and dependability requirement such as face recognition,
autonomous driving car and malware detection [4, 5, 6]. In-
vestigating adversarial examples has become an increasingly
prevailing topic to develop potential defensive measures
in trustworthy ML. It essentially lays the groundwork for
building a new generation of highly robust and reliable ML
models acting as the core engine of future AI technology.
However, most of preliminary studies on this topic are
restricted to the white-box setting where the adversary has
complete access and knowledge of the target system (e.g.,
DNNs) [2, 7, 8, 9]. Despite the theoretical interest, white-box
attack methods are not adapted to practical black-box threat
models. It is often the case that internal states/configurations
and operating mechanism of public ML systems are not
revealed to the practitioners (e.g., Google Cloud Vision API).
Accordingly, the only mode of interaction with the system
is via submitting inputs and receiving the corresponding
predicted outputs.
To boost the practicality of such approaches, a few re-
cent works have introduced a new class of threat models
that exploit either a surrogate of the target model [10] or
a gradient-free attack method [11, 12]. However, adversar-
ial attacks that exploit a surrogate of the target model tend
to yield low success rate if the surrogate is inaccurate. On
the other hand, while attacks that use zeroth-order gradi-
ent estimation [11] are often more effective, they require
a large number of queries to obtain an accurate estimate.
Thus they are usually not economically efficient, especially
in query-limited settings due to budget constraints.
To mitigate the above limitations of the existing literature,
this paper introduces a new perspective in the design of black-
box adversarial attacks: We propose a general attack frame-
work based on an operator splitting method, the alternating
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direction method of multipliers (ADMM), which integrates
with both zeroth-order (ZO) optimization and Bayesian opti-
mization (BO). Furthermore, unlike previous works which
for ease of optimization often assume a specific distortion
metric between an input and its perturbed version, our pro-
posed framework is amenable to a broad family of distortion
metrics including those previously used in the literature.
Our Contributions:
•We propose a general black-box adversarial attack frame-
work via ADMM, including zeroth-order ADMM (ZO-
ADMM) and ADMM with Bayesian optimization (BO-
ADMM). We exploit a promising ZO-ADMM with random
gradient estimation (RGE) [13] to design efficient black-box
attacks that generalize the previous ZO coordinate descent
based black-box attacks [11] and sidestep the notoriously
intensive query complexity of attacks based on coordinate-
wise random gradient estimation. Besides, we integrate the
ADMM with BO for higher query efficiency in black-box
settings (Section 4).
• We further generalize our formulation to accommodate
various bounded `p-norm-ball distortion metrics and their
linear spans in the metric space (see Section 4.1). Such
an extension is highly non-trivial to be incorporated into
existing formulations of other black-box attacks, which are
often heavily customized towards a specific norm-ball (e.g.,
`2 or `∞) for distortion metrics.
• Our framework is also made flexible to robustly accom-
modate for various threat models of the black-box attack
(Section 5), which includes both score-based and decision-
based settings. The former allows the attacker to have access
to a vector of assessment scores for all output candidates
(soft labels). And the latter only provides the system’s final
decision on the most probable output (hard labels).
• Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed
framework on a variety of real-world image classification
datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The em-
pirical results consistently show that our framework perform
competitively to existing works in terms of the attack suc-
cess rate while achieving a significant reduction on the query
complexity (Section 6).
2. Related Works
The vulnerability of DNNs was first studied in the seminal
works [14, 3], which were followed by a series of white-box
threat models [2, 8, 15] that assume full access of the tar-
get model’s internal parameters/configurations. However,
such internal knowledge of the target model is often not
revealed and the adversary can only interact with it via sub-
mitting input queries and receiving feedback on potential
outputs. Therefore, in the remaining of this section, we will
summarize recent advances on black-box adversarial attacks
and discuss their limitations in comparison to our proposed
framework.
2.1. Black-box Attack with Surrogate Model
A black-box attack using surrogate model is essentially a
transfer attack [10] in which the adversary trains a DNN with
data labeled by the target model. The resulting DNN is then
exploited as a surrogate of the target model for which we can
apply any state-of-the-art white-box attacks without requir-
ing full access to internal states and operating mechanisms
of the target model. Such attacks however depend heavily
on the quality of training a surrogate model that closely
resembles the true target model [16]. As a result, transfer
attack tends to yield low success rate in data-intensive do-
mains (e.g., ImageNet) for which it is hard to find a qualifiled
surrogate.
2.2. Black-box Attacks with Gradient Estimation
Another approach to explore black-box attacks is to use
gradient estimation via zeroth-order optimization (ZOO)
[11]. They make queries to the model and estimate the out-
put gradients with respect to the corresponding inputs, and
then apply the state-of-the-art C&W attack method [8] to
generate adversarial examples. However, this method is very
computationally intensive as it requires a large number of
queries per iteration to generate an accurate gradient estima-
tion. Alternatively, the work [17] aims to estimate output gra-
dient via greedy local search. At each iteration, the proposed
technique perturbs only a small subset of input component.
Such local search technique is very computationally efficient
but it does not explicitly minimize the distortion between the
original input and its perturbed version, the crafted noises
often appear more visible. The work [18] investigates the
more realistic threat models by defining the query-limited
setting, the partial information setting, and the label-only
setting. Three attacks methods are proposed based on the
Natural Evolutionary Strategies and Monte Carlo approxi-
mation. But it only puts limits on the `∞ norm instead of
minimizing a certain `p norm. Based on [18], the work [19]
further investigates to utilize the prior information including
the time-dependent priors (i.e., successive gradients are in
fact heavily correlated) and the data-dependent priors (i.e.,
images tend to exhibit a spatially local similarity ) for higher
query efficiency.
2.3. Other Black-box Attacks
In addition to the aforementioned works, there are also
other black-box attacks [20, 21, 22, 23] under different prac-
tical settings, which are explored very recently. Among those,
the notable boundary method [20] implements a decision-
based attack, which starts from a very large adversarial per-
turbation (thus causing an immediate misclassification) and
tries to reduce the perturbation (i.e., minimize the distor-
tion) through a random walk while remaining adversarial
via staying on the boundary between the misclassified class
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and the true class. However, it suffers from high computa-
tional complexity due to a huge number of queries needed
to decrease the distortion and it also has no guarantee on the
convergence. Different from [20], the work [23] formulates
the hard-label black-box attack as a real-valued optimization
problem which is usually continuous and can be solved by
the zeroth-order optimization algorithm.
In this paper, we will instead introduce an interesting
reformulation of adversarial black-box attack based on
ADMM, including ZO-ADMM [13] that enjoys the operator
splitting advantage of ADMM and BO-ADMM that reduces
the query complexity with the aid of Gaussian process.
3. Problem Formulation
In this work, we focus on adversarial attacks in the appli-
cation of image classification with DNNs. In what follows,
we first provide a general problem formulation for adversar-
ial attack which is amenable to either white-box or black-box
settings. Then, we will develop an efficient solution to the
more interesting black-box setting where the adversary only
has access to certain types of output of the DNN model (its
internal structures and configurations are unknown to the
adversary). Specifically, given a legitimate image x0 ∈ Rd
with its correct class label t0, we aim to design an optimal
adversarial perturbation δ ∈ Rd so that the perturbed exam-
ple (x0 + δ) is misclassified to target class t 6= t0 by the
DNN model trained on legitimate images. The adversarial
perturbation δ can be obtained by solving the problem of the
generic form,
minimize
δ
f(x0 + δ, t) + γD(δ)
subject to (x0 + δ) ∈ [0, 1]d, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ,
(1)
where f(x, t) denotes an attack loss incurred by misclassify-
ing (x0 + δ) to target class t, D(δ) is a distortion function
that controls perceptual similarity between a legitimate im-
age and an adversarial example, and ‖ · ‖∞ signifies the
`∞ norm. In problem (1), the ‘hard’ constraints ensure that
the perturbed noise δ at each pixel (normalized to [0, 1]) is
imperceptible up to a predefined -tolerant threshold, and
the non-negative parameter γ places emphasis on the dis-
tortion. Furthermore, in the above problem, we mainly set
D(δ) = ‖δ‖22, which is motivated by the superior perfor-
mance of the outstanding C&W `2 adversarial attack. We
highlight that D(δ) can take other forms of `p norms as
discussed in Section 4.1.
The problem (1) is the general form of the problem in
[18, 19] which does not consider the D(δ) term. The ad-
vantage is that we are able to minimize the `p distortion
after the adversarial perturbation is obtained, thus keeping
the perturbation imperceptible. More specifically, if  is too
small, we may not be able to obtain a successful adversarial
example. Thus, we need to increase  to achieve a successful
adversarial attack. But since  only limits the largest element
of the perturbation, the whole perturbation over the image
might be relatively large and easy to be recognized in case
of large . Thus, the D(δ) term in problem (1) helps to mini-
mize the `p distortion of the whole perturbation, keeping it
unnoticeable.
In the remaining of this section, we will discuss possi-
ble choices for the loss function f(x, t). Note that, without
loss of generality, we only focus on targeted attack with
designated target class t to mislead the DNN since the un-
targeted attack version can be easily implemented similar to
the targeted attack [8]. We also emphasize that in the black-
box setting, the gradients of f(x, t) can not be obtained
directly as it does in the white-box setting. The form of the
loss function f(x, t) depends on the constrained information
in different black-box feedback settings. In particular, the
definition of score-based (Section 3.1) and decision-based
(Section 3.2) attacks as well as their loss functions will be
discussed in the following subsections.
3.1. Score-based Attack
In the score-based attack setting, the adversaries are able
to make queries to DNN to obtain the soft labels (i.e., scores
or probabilities of an image belonging to different classes),
while information on gradients are not available. The loss
function of problem (1) in the score-based attack is:
f(x0 + δ, t) = max{max
j 6=t
{logP (x0 + δ)j}
− logP (x0 + δ)t,−κ}, (2)
which is motivated by [8] and yields the best known perfor-
mance among white-box attacks. P (x)j denotes the target
model’s prediction score or probability of the j-th class, and
κ is a confidence parameter which is usually set to zero. Ba-
sically, this implies f(x0 + δ, t) = 0 if P (x0 + δ)t is the
largest among all classes, which means the perturbation δ
has successfully made the target model misclassified x0 + δ
to target class t. Otherwise, it will be larger than zero. Note
that in Eqn. (2) the log probability logP (x) is used instead
of directly using the actual probability P (x). This is based
on the observation that the output probability distribution
tends to have one dominating class, making the query on
the probability/score less effective. The utilization of the log
operator can help to reduce the effect of the dominating class
while it preserves the probability order for all classes.
3.2. Decision-based Attack
Different from the score-based attack, the decision-based
attack is more challenging in that the adversaries can only
make queries to get the hard-labels instead of the soft-labels.
Let H(x)i denote the hard-label decision. H(x)i = 1 if
the decision for x is label i, and 0 otherwise. We also have
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∑K
i=1H(x)i = 1 for all K classes. Then the loss function
of problem (1) in the decision-based attack is specified as
f(x0 + δ, t) = max
j 6=t
H(x0 + δ)j −H(x0 + δ)t, (3)
Therefore, f(x0+δ, t) ∈ {−1, 1}, and the attacker succeeds
if f(x0 + δ, t) = −1. The loss function (3) is nonsmooth
with discrete outputs. The decision-based attack is therefore
more challenging because existing combinatorial optimiza-
tion methods become almost ineffective or inapplicable.
4. A General Black-box Adversarial Attack
Framework
This section develops a general black-box adversarial at-
tack framework for both the score-based and decision-based
attacks by leveraging ADMM and gradient-free optimiza-
tion. We will show that the proposed attack framework yields
the following benefits: a) an efficient splitting between the
black-box loss function and the adversarial distortion func-
tion, b) generalization to various `p norm involved hard/soft
constraints, and c) compatibility to different gradient-free
operations. By introducing an auxiliary variable z, problem
(1) can be rewritten in the favor of ADMM-type methods
[24],
minimize
δ,z
f(x0 + δ, t) + γD(z) + I(z)
subject to z = δ,
(4)
where I(z) is the indicator function given by,
I(z) =
{
0 (x0 + z) ∈ [0, 1]d, ‖z‖∞ ≤ ,
∞ otherwise. (5)
The augmented Lagrangian of the reformulated problem
(4) is given by
L(z, δ,u) = γD(z) + I(z) + f(x0 + δ, t) (6)
+uT (z− δ) + ρ
2
‖z− δ‖22,
where u is Lagrangian multiplier, and ρ > 0 is a given
penalty parameter. It can be further transformed as below,
L(z, δ,u) = γD(z) + I(z) + f(x0 + δ, t) (7)
+
ρ
2
∥∥∥∥z − δ + 1ρu
∥∥∥∥2
2
− 1
2ρ
‖u‖22 .
The ADMM algorithm [24] splits optimization variables
into two blocks and adopts the following iterative scheme,
zk+1 = arg min
z
L(z, δk,uk), (8)
δk+1 = arg min
δ
L(zk+1, δ,uk), (9)
uk+1 = uk + ρ(zk+1 − δk+1), (10)
where k denotes the iteration index. In problem (8), we
minimize L(z, δ,u) over z given parameters δk and uk. In
problem (9), we minimizeL(z, δ,u) over δ given zk+1 from
the previous step and uk. Then, the Lagrangian multiplier u
is updated in Eqn. (10). The major advantage of this ADMM-
type algorithm is that it allows us to split the original complex
problem into sub-problems, each of which can be solved
more efficiently or even analytically. In what follows, we
solve problems (8) and (9) respectively.
4.1. z-step
Problem (8) can be rewritten as
minimize
z
D(z) + ρ2γ ‖z− a‖22
subject to (x0 + z) ∈ [0, 1]d, ‖z‖∞ ≤ ,
(11)
where a = δk−(1/ρ)uk. We setD(z) = ‖z‖22 [8]. Problem
(11) can be decomposed elementwise as below,
minimize
zi
(
zi − ρ2γ+ρai
)2
subject to ([x0]i + zi) ∈ [0, 1], |zi| ≤ ,
(12)
where [x]i (or xi) denotes the i-th element of x. The solution
to problem (12) is then given by
[zk+1]i =

min{1− [x0]i , } ρ2γ+ρai > min{1− [x0]i , }
max{− [x0]i ,−} ρ2γ+ρai < max{− [x0]i ,−}
ρ
2γ+ρ
ai otherwise.
(13)
Generalization to various `p norms. In problem (11), in
addition to the worst-case perturbation constraint ‖z‖∞ ≤ ,
it is a common practice to set D(z) = ‖z‖22 to measure the
similarity between the legitimate image and the adversarial
example. If D(z) takes other `p norms such as ‖z‖0, ‖z‖1,
or even `p norm combinations like ‖z‖1 + β2 ‖z‖22 for β ≥ 0,
we are still able to obtain the solutions with minor modifica-
tions in the z-step. This ability is highly non-trivial for other
black-box attacks, which are often heavily customized to
minimize a specific `p norm for distortion measure. Due to
space limitation, we explicitly show the z-step solutions of
D(z) = ‖z‖0, D(z) = ‖z‖1 and D(z) = ‖z‖1 + β2 ‖z‖22
derived with proximal operators [25] in the supplementary
material.
4.2. δ-step
Problem (9) can be written as
minimize
δ
f(x0 + δ, t) +
ρ
2‖δ − b‖22, (14)
where b = zk+1 + (1/ρ)uk. In the white-box setting, since
the gradients of f(x0 +δ, t) are directly accessible, gradient
descent method like stochastic gradient descent (SGD) or
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Adam can be applied straight-forwardly. However, in black-
box settings, the gradients of f(x0 + δ, t) are unavailable.
Thus, to overcome this difficulty, we adopt two derivative-
free methods: the random gradient estimation (RGE) method
[26] and the Bayesian optimization [27] corresponding to
ZO-ADMM and BO-ADMM, respectively.
4.2.1 Random gradient estimation
In the black-box setting, the gradient of f(x0 + δ, t) is
estimated through random gradient estimation (RGE),
∇ˆf(δ) = (d/(νQ))
Q∑
j=1
[
f(δ + νuj)− f(δ)
]
uj , (15)
where d is the number of optimization variables, ν > 0
is a smoothing parameter, {uj} denote independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random direction vectors drawn
from a uniform distribution over a unit sphere, and Q is the
number of random direction vectors. It has been shown in
[13] that a large Q reduces the gradient estimation error and
improves the convergence of ZO-ADMM. However, we find
that a moderate size ofQ is sufficient to provide a good trade-
off between estimation error and query complexity, e.g.,Q =
20 in our experiments. We also highlight that the RGE in
(15) only requires O(Q) query complexity instead of O(dQ)
caused by coordinate-wise gradient estimation used in [11].
Note that the natural evolutionary strategy (NES) [18] uses
a central difference based gradient estimator requiring 2Q
queries. By contrast, RGE uses a forward difference based
random gradient estimator, yielding Q + 1 query counts,
leading to higher query efficiency.
With the aid of RGE, the solution to problem (14) can
now be obtained via stochastic gradient descent-like meth-
ods. However, it suffers from extremely high iteration and
function query complexity duo to the non-linearity of f
as well as the iterative nature of ADMM. To sidestep this
computational bottleneck, we propose the use of the lin-
earized ADMM algorithm [28] in ZO-ADMM with RGE,
and thus it enjoys dual advantages of gradient-free oper-
ation and linearization of the loss function. By lineariza-
tion, the loss function f(x0 + δ, t) in problem (14) is re-
placed with its first-order Taylor expansion plus a regu-
larization term (known as Bregman divergence), that is,
∇ˆf(δk+x0, t))T (δ−δk)+ 12‖δ−δk‖2G, whereG is a pre-
defined positive definite matrix, and ‖x‖2G = xTGx. We
choose G = ηkI where 1/ηk > 0 is a decaying parameter,
e.g., ηk = α
√
k for a given constant α > 0. The Bregman
divergence term is used to stabilize the convergence of δ.
Combining linearization and RGE, problem (14) now
takes the following form:
minimize
δ
(∇ˆf(δk + x0, t))T (δ − δk)
+ηk2 ‖δ − δk‖22 + ρ2‖δ − b‖22,
(16)
which yields a quadratic programming problem with the
following closed-form solution:
δk+1 = (1/ (ηk + ρ))
(
ηkδ
k + ρb− ∇ˆf(δk + x0, t)
)
. (17)
Note that Eqn. (17) can be calculated with only one step
of gradient estimation, which is a significant improvement
on query efficiency compared with solving problem (14)
using gradient descent method with thousands of random
estimations. The convergence of the linearized ADMM for
non-convex problems is proved in [29].
4.2.2 Bayesian Optimization
In addition to RGE, BO is an alternative approach to solve
problem (14). We model l(δ) := f(x0 + δ, t) + ρ2‖δ−b‖22
as a Gaussian process with a prior distribution l(·) ∼
N (µ0, κ(·, ·)), where µ0 = 0 in practice and κ(·, ·) is a posi-
tive definite kernel [30]. Consider a finite collection of noisy
observations Dk = {y1, . . . , yk}, where yi ∼ N (l(δi), σ2n),
and σ2n is the noise variance. The posterior probability of
a new function l(δ) evaluation given Dk is a Gaussian dis-
tribution with mean µ and variance σ, that is l(δ)|Dk ∼
N (µ, σ2), where
µ = κT [K+ σ2nI]
−1y, (18)
σ2 = κ(δ, δ)− κT [K+ σ2nI]−1κ, (19)
Kij = κ(δ
i, δj), κ is a vector of covariance terms between
{δi}ki=1 and δ, namely, κi = κ(δi, δ).
We choose the kernel function κ(·, ·) as the ARD Mate´rn
5/2 kernel [31, 30],
κ(x,y) = θ20exp(−
√
5r)(1 +
√
5r +
5
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r2), (20)
r2 =
d∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2/θ2i , (21)
where {θi}di=0 are hyperparameters. Note that κ(δ, δ) = θ20 .
To determine the hyper-parameters θ = {{θi}di=0, σ2n},
we minimize the negative log marginal likelihood
log p(Dk|θ) [30],
minimize
θ
L(θ) , 1
2
log |K+ σ2nI| (22)
+
1
2
y>
(
K+ σ2nI
)−1
y,
where y = [y1 y2 . . . yk]>. This can be achieved by a
standard gradient descent routine θ ← θ−η∂L/∂θ with a
sufficiently small learning rate η.
In the setting of BO, the solution to problem (14) is often
acquired by maximizing the expected improvement (EI). The
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EI acquisition function is defined as [30]
δk+1 = arg max EI(δ)
= arg maxEl(δ)|Dk
[(
l+ − l(δ)) I(l(δ) ≤ l+)] ,
= arg max
δ
(l+ − µ)Φ
(
l+ − µ
σ
)
+ σφ
(
l+ − µ
σ
)
,
(23)
where l+ denotes the best observed value, and I(l(δ) ≤
l+) = 1 if l(δ) ≤ l+, and 0 otherwise. Φ and φ denote the
CDF and PDF of the standard normal distribution, respec-
tively. We refer readers to the supplementary material for the
detailed derivation of Eq. (23). We obtain δk+1 through the
projected gradient descent method,
δˆ(k+1) = δ(k) + η∇δ=δ(k)EI(δ), (24)
δ(k+1) = Proj(x0 + δ) ∈ [0, 1]d, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ 
(
δˆ(k+1)
)
. (25)
The projection is introduced to ensure the feasibility of the
next query point in BO.
5. Customized Score-based and Decision-based
Black-box Attacks
For the score-based black-box attack, problem (1) with
loss function (2) can be naturally solved through the general
ADMM framework.
In the decision-based black-box attack, the form of the
loss function (3) is non-smooth with discrete outputs. To
overcome the discontinuity in Eqn. (3), a smoothing version
of (3), denoted by fµ with smoothing parameter µ > 0
[32, 33], is taken into consideration,
fµ(x0 + δ, t) = Eu∈Ub [f(x0 + δ + µu, t)] , (26)
where Ub is a uniform distribution within the unit Eu-
clidean ball, or u can follow a standard Gaussian dis-
tribution [18]. The rational behind the smoothing tech-
nique in (26) is that the convolution of two functions, i.e.,∫
u
f(x0 + δ + µu, t)p(u)du, is at least as smooth as the
smoothest of the two original functions [34]. Therefore,
when p is the density of a random variable with respect
to Lebesgue measure, the loss function (26) is then smooth.
In practice, we consider an empirical Monte Carlo approxi-
mation of (26)
fµ(x0 + δ, t) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
f(x0 + δ + µui, t), (27)
where {ui} are N i.i.d. samples drawn from Ub. With the
smoothed loss function as expressed in Eqn. (27), problem
(1) can be solved by the proposed general ADMM frame-
work. To initialize ADMM, we initialize the perturbation δ
so that the initial perturbed image belongs to the target class,
yielding a benefit of reducing query complexity compared to
the initialization with an arbitrary image [20].
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, the experimental results of the score-based
and decision-based black-box attacks are demonstrated. We
compare the proposed ADMM-based framework with var-
ious attack methods on three image classification datasets,
MNIST [35], CIFAR-10 [36] and ImageNet [37]. The results
of state-of-the-art white-box attack (i.e., C&W attack) are
also provided for reference.
We train two networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets, respectively, which can achieve 99.5% accuracy
on MNIST and 80% accuracy on CIFAR-10. The model
architecture has four convolutional layers, two max pooling
layers, two fully connected layers and a softmax layer. For
ImageNet, we utilize a pre-trained Inception v3 network [38]
instead of training our own model, which can achieve 96%
top-5 accuracy. All experiments are conducted on machines
with NVIDIA GTX 1080 TI GPUs.
6.1. Evaluation on MNIST and CIFAR-10
In the evaluation on MNIST and CIFAR-10, 200 correctly
classified images are selected from MNIST and CIFAR-10
test datasets, respectively. For each image, the target labels
are set to the other 9 classes and a total of 1800 attacks are
performed for each attack method.
The implementations of C&W (white-box) attack [8] and
ZOO (black-box) attack [11] are based on the GitHub code
released by the authors1. For ZOO attack, we use ZOO-
Adam with default Adam parameters. For the transfer attack
[10], we apply C&W attack to the surrogate model with κ =
20 to improve the attack transferability and 2,000 iterations
in each binary search step. In the proposed ZO-ADMM
attack1, the sampling number in random gradient estimation
as defined in Eqn. (15), Q, is set to 20 and the sampling
number for the decision-based smoothed loss function (27),
N , is set to 10. We set ρ = 10 and γ = 1 for MNIST,
ρ = 2000 and γ = 10 for CIFAR-10, and ρ = 1000 and
γ = 1 for ImageNet.  is set to 1 for MNIST and CIFAR-10
2 and 0.05 for ImageNet. In Eq. (15), we set ν = 0.5 for
three datasets. The parameter µ in Eq. (27) is set to 1 for
MNIST, 0.1 for CIFAR-10, and 0.01 for ImageNet.
The experimental results are shown in Table 1. Besides
the attack success rate (ASR) and the `p norms, we report the
query number required to achieve the first successful attack,
which characterizes how fast the generated adversarial per-
turbation can mislead DNNs. We observe that the transfer
attack suffers from low ASR and large `2 distortion. Both the
ZOO attack and the proposed ZO-ADMM attack with RGE
can achieve high ASR and competitive `2 distortion close to
the C&W white-box attack. Compared with the ZOO attack,
1Codes will be available upon publication of this work.
2This setting is intended to make a fair comparison to the pure `2-norm
attack framework ZOO.
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Table 1. Performance evaluation of adversarial attacks on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Data set Attack method ASR
`1
distortion
`2
distortion
`∞
distortion
Query count on
initial success
Reduction ratio on
query count
MNIST
white
-box
C&W white-box attack [8] 100% 22.14 1.962 0.5194 - -
Transfer attack (via C&W) [10] 30.6% 65.2 4.545 0.803 - -
score
-based
ZOO attack [11] 98.8% 26.78 1.977 0.522 12,161 0.0 %
score-based ZO-ADMM attack 98.3% 26.23 1.975 0.513 493.6 95.9%
score-based BO-ADMM attack 87% 93.6 7.7 0.71 52.1 99.6%
decision
-based
boundary attack [20] 99% 32.9 2.21 0.563 25,328a 0%
decision-based ZO-ADMM attack 100 % 30.48 2.166 0.548 7,603 a 62%
CIFAR-10
white
-box
C&W white-box attack [8] 100 % 11.7 0.332 0.0349 - -
Transfer attack (via C&W) [10] 8.5% 103.6 3.845 0.421 - -
score
-based
ZOO attack [11] 97.6 % 15.2 0.361 0.0405 9982 0.0 %
score-based ZO-ADMM attack 98.7 % 13.1 0.417 0.0392 421 95.7%
score-based BO-ADMM attack 84.1% 148 5.29 0.62 46.3 99.6%
decision
-based
boundary attack [20] 100% 19.4 0.421 0.045 16,720 a 0%
decision-based ZO-ADMM attack 100% 17.25 0.415 0.0413 6,213 a 63%
a As the decision-based attacks start from images in the target class, it achieves initial success immediately. Therefore, the query count on the initial
success of the decision-based attack actually means the query number when it achieves the reported `2 distortion.
Query=0, 
Distortion=10.2
Query=3025, 
Distortion=7.1
Query=6050, 
Distortion=4.6
Query=12100, 
Distortion=2.59
Query=18150, 
Distortion=1.7
Query=36300, 
Distortion=1.27
original
(a) An adversarial example evolution for MNIST starting from an
image in the target class.
Query=0, 
Distortion=15.2
Query=3025, 
Distortion=5.8
Query=6050, 
Distortion=3.17
Query=12100, 
Distortion=1.32
Query=18150, 
Distortion=0.79
Query=36300, 
Distortion=0.64 original
(b) An adversarial example evolution for CIFAR-10 starting from an
image in the target class.
Figure 1. Adversarial examples generated by the proposed decision-
based ZO-ADMM attack on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
the score-based ZO-ADMM attack requires fewer queries
to obtain the first successful adversarial example. The query
count in ZO-ADMM attack with RGE is reduced by 95.9%
and 95.7% on MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. The
reduction of query number is achieved by Eq. (17) in ZO-
ADMM, which only requires one step of gradient estimation
to solve the approximation problem instead of thousands of
steps to solve the original problem. We also observe that the
score-based BO-ADMM attack can achieve smaller query
number compared with the RGE method, but it causes much
larger `p distortion. The reason is that BO-ADMM does not
have very precise control for the perturbation. So it requires
larger perturbation to mislead the DNN model.
We notice that the decision-based ZO-ADMM attack
achieves an `2 distortion slightly larger than the score-based
attack with more queries as shown in Table 1. This is not
surprising, since only the hard label outputs are available
in the decision-based attack, which is more difficult to be
optimized than the score-based attack. Although the `2 dis-
tortion is a bit larger, the perturbations are still visually indis-
tinguishable. We compare the decision-based ZO-ADMM
attack with the boundary attack [20]. As demonstrated in
Table 1, the queries of the decision-based ZO-ADMM attack
is about 60% less than that of the boundary attack to achieve
the same level `2 distortion. We show the evolution of sev-
eral adversarial examples in the decision-based attack versus
the query number in Fig. 1. The decision-based attack starts
from an image in the target class. Then it tries to decrease the
`2 norm while keeping the classified label unchanged. After
about 20,000 queries, the example is close to the original
image with a satisfied `2 distortion.
6.2. Evaluation on ImageNet
We perform targeted and untargeted attacks in the score-
based and decision-based settings on ImageNet. 100 cor-
rectly classified images are randomly selected. For each
image in targeted attack, 9 random labels out of 1000 classes
are selected to serve as the targets. We do not perform the
transfer attack since it does not scale well to ImageNet due
to training of the surrogate model. Instead, we provide the
results of new baselines on ImageNet, including the query-
limited attack as well as the label-only attack proposed in
[18], and the bandit optimization based attack with time and
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Table 2. Performance evaluation of adversarial attacks on ImageNet.
Untargeted attack Targeted attack
Attack method ASR
Query count on
initial success Reduction ratio ASR
Query count on
initial success Reduction ratio
score-based
C&W white-box attack [8] 100% - - 99% - -
ZOO attack [11] 90% 15631 0.0% 78% 2.11× 106 0.0%
Query-limited attack [18] 100% 4785 69.4% 98% 34128 98.4%
BanditsTD attack [19] 94% 1259 92% - a - -
score-based ZO-ADMM attack 98% 891 94.3% 97% 16058 99.2%
decision-based Label only [18] -
b - - 92 % 1.89× 106 c 10.4%
decision-based ZO-ADMM attack 100% 11742 c 24.9% 94% 1.52× 106 c 28%
a It mainly explores untargeted attack. b The label only attack mainly explores targeted attack. c The query count on initial success for the
decision-based attack means the query number when it achieves the same `2 distortion with the ZOO attack on its initial success.
data-dependent priors (named as BanditsTD) [19]. The query-
limited and BanditsTD attacks are score-based attacks. The
label-only attack is a decision-based attack.
The experimental results are summarized in Table 2. For
score-based attacks, we can observe that the score-based ZO-
ADMM attack can achieve a high ASR with fewer queries
than the other attacks. It reduces the query number on initial
success by 94.3% and 99.2% for untargeted and targeted
attacks, respectively, compared with the ZOO attack. For
decision-based attacks, the ZO-ADMM attack can obtain a
high ASR with fewer queries compared with the label-only
attack or even the ZOO attack using score-based information.
Some adversarial examples generated by the ZO-ADMM
attack are demonstrated in the supplementary material.
6.3. Convergence of the ZO-ADMM Attack
In Fig. 3, we demonstrate the convergence of the pro-
posed ZO-AMM targeted black-box attack, where the aver-
age `2 distortion of 9 targeted adversarial examples versus
the query number is presented. As we can see, since we ini-
tialize the adversarial distortion from zeros, the score-based
ZO-ADMM attack increases `2 distortion until a successful
adversarial example is found. After that, it tries to decrease
the `2 distortion but keeps the target label unchanged. For
the decision-based attack, Fig 3 shows that the `2 distortion
is initially large as ZO-ADMM starts from an image in the
target class instead of the original image. The resulting `2
distortion then decreases as the query number increases. We
highlight that the ZO-ADMM attack is able to reach the
successful attack with hundreds of queries on MNIST or
CIFAR-10 and tens of thousands of queries on ImageNet,
which significantly outperforms the ZOO attack. Besides Fig.
3 demonstrating the `2 distortion versus query number, we
present the `2 distortion versus ADMM iteration number in
the supplementary material and similar results can be drawn.
6.4. Evaluation for Various `p Norms
In the previous experiments, we mainly consider the case
of D(z) = ‖z‖22 for a fair comparison with other white-box
and black-box algorithms. However, we highlight that the
ZO-ADMM method is able to optimize various `p norms,
not only `2 norm. In Table 3, we present the experimental
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Figure 2. Convergence of the ZO-ADMM attack.
Table 3. Performance evaluation of the ZO-ADMM attacks on
MNIST for different `p norms.
Attack method ASR `0 `1 `2
ZO-ADMM `0 100% 18.5 12.6 9.72
ZO-ADMM `1 100% 465 10.5 2.71
ZO-ADMM `2 100% 483 22.09 1.93
results for different `p norms when solving problem (11).
Here we focus on three score-based black-box attacks with
ZO-ADMM by minimizing the `0, `1 and `2 distortion, re-
spectively. As we can see, our proposed method is well
adapted to different `p norms in the design of black-box
adversarial examples.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general framework to de-
sign norm-ball bounded black-box adversarial examples by
leveraging an operator splitting method (namely, ADMM),
together with the gradient-free operations including random
gradient estimation and Bayesian optimization. The pro-
posed framework can be applied to both score-based and
decision-based settings. Compared to state-of-the-art black-
box attacks, our approach achieves better query efficiency
8
without losing the attack performance in terms of attack
success rate as well as `p-norm distortion.
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Appendix A. Solutions for different `p norms
in z-step
In problem (11), we set D(z) = ‖z‖22 to measure the
similarity between the legitimate image and the adversarial
example. But D(z) can also take other `p norms and the
solutions in z-step can be obtained with minor modifica-
tions. In the following, we show the z-step solutions3 for
D(z) = ‖z‖0, D(z) = ‖z‖1, and D(z) = ‖z‖1 + β2 ‖z‖22,
derived from proximal operators which are applicable and
well-suited to problems of substantial recent interest involv-
ing large or high-dimensional datasets.
A.1. Solutions for `0 norm
If D(z) = ‖z‖0, the solution to problem (11) can be
obtained as follows,
[zk+1]i =
{
min{1− [x0]i , } if ci > min{1− [x0]i , }
max{− [x0]i ,−} if ci < max{− [x0]i ,−}
ci otherwise,
(28)
where
ci =
{
ai if a
2
i >
2γ
ρ
0 otherwise
(29)
A.2. Solutions for `1 norm
If D(z) = ‖z‖1, the solution to problem (11) can be
obtained as below,
[zk+1]i =

min{1− [x0]i , } if (ai − γρ )+ − (−ai − γρ )+
> min{1− [x0]i , }
max{− [x0]i ,−} if (ai − γρ )+ − (−ai − γρ )+
< max{− [x0]i ,−}
(ai − γρ )+
−(−ai − γρ )+ otherwise,
(30)
where (x)+ = x if x ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
A.3. Solutions for combination of `1 and `2 norm
If D(z) = ‖z‖1 + β2 ‖z‖22, which is also know as elas-
tic net regularization, the solution to problem (11) can be
3We do not investigate the case of `∞ norm since the constraint
‖z‖∞ ≤  on the `∞ norm is already taken into consideration.
obtained through,
[zk+1]i =

min{1− [x0]i , } if 11+ γβ
ρ
((ai − γρ )+
−(−ai − γρ )+)
> min{1− [x0]i , }
max{− [x0]i ,−} if 11+ γβ
ρ
((ai − γρ )+
−(−ai − γρ )+)
< max{− [x0]i ,−}
1
1+ γβ
ρ
((ai − γρ )+
−(−ai − γρ )+) otherwise,
(31)
Appendix B. Derivation for maximizing EI
EI can be transformed as follows,
EI(δ)
l′= l(δ)−µσ= El′
[
(l+ − l′σ − µ)I
(
l′ ≤ l
+ − µ
σ
)]
= (l+ − µ)Φ
(
l+ − µ
σ
)
− σEl′
[
l′I
(
l′ ≤ l
+ − µ
σ
)]
= (l+ − µ)Φ
(
l+ − µ
σ
)
− σ
∫ l+−µ
σ
−∞
l′φ(l′)dl′
= (l+ − µ)Φ
(
l+ − µ
σ
)
+ σφ
(
l+ − µ
σ
)
, (32)
Appendix C. Convergence of the ZO-ADMM
attack.
Appendix D. Examples for the decision-based
ZO-ADMM attack
In the following, we provide more adversarial examples
generated by the proposed ZO-ADMM decision-based black-
box attack.
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Figure 3. Convergence of the ZO-ADMM attack.
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Figure 4. Adversarial examples generated by the proposed decision-
based black-box attack with ZO-ADMM on MNIST and CIFAR-
10.
Dungeness crabkoala
sea slug car mirror
sea slug
megalith
black swan
Angora
Figure 5. Adversarial examples on ImageNet. The original images
are on the top row and their corresponding adversarial examples
are shown on the bottom row with target labels.
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